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Abstract 
I examine a property of theories called ‘background-independence’ that Einsteinian gravitation is 
thought to exemplify. This concept has figured in the work of Rovelli (2001; 2004), Smolin 
(2006), Giulini (2007), and Belot (2011), among others. I propose and evaluate a few candidates 
for background-independence, and I show that there is something chimaerical about the concept. 
I argue, however, that there is a proposal that clarifies the feature of Einsteinian gravitation that 
motivates the concept. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This essay examines the origin and extension of the concept of background-structure in classical 
field theories. The extension of the concept, before the recent work of Smolin (2006), Belot 
(2011), and others, was easily circumscribed. The concept denoted what is characteristic of the 
space-time structures of Newtonian theory and special relativity. 
 
Newton’s laws express criteria of causal interaction. They articulate an account in which 
the physical quantity force is the cause of the acceleration of mass. The content of the laws can be 
summarised as follows: Given a system of particles in motion, there exists a reference frame and 
a time-scale relative to which every acceleration is proportional to and in the direction of the 
force applied, and where every such force belongs to an action-reaction pair.1 Furthermore, given 
such a reference frame, forces and masses, accelerations and rotations have the same measured 
values whether that frame is at rest or in uniform translatory motion. In other words, the laws of 
                                                
†A version of this essay has been published in Philosophy of Science 78, no. 5 (2011): S1070-S1081, which is the 
PSA 2010 edition. The present version was included in my thesis and it reflects further conversations on this topic 
with a number of people, especially my advisors, my examiners, and Erik Curiel. 
1I owe this formulation to Thomson (1884, p. 387) and Muirhead (1887, pp. 479-480). 
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motion satisfy the Galilei-Newton relativity principle. The equivalence-class structure determined 
by the invariance of the laws under the Galilean transformations is the structure of Newtonian 
space-time. 
 
From a retrospective point of view, the structure of the space-times of the Newtonian and 
special-relativistic frameworks can be equally well discussed in terms of the mathematical 
structures that their classes of inertial frames presuppose. In the Newtonian framework, those 
frames presuppose a global affine structure and separate metrical structures for space and time; in 
the special-relativistic one, they presuppose global affine and conformal structures and also the 
metrical structure of space-time. In both frameworks, these structures are fixed independently of 
the theories of special systems, and thus these structures do not evolve along with the special 
systems. To use a common figure, space and time are the ‘stage’ on which the ‘actors’, namely 
the physical fields, move. 
 
One of the great empirical claims of Einsteinian gravitation is that space-time structure is 
dynamical, and thus something to be discovered empirically. Einsteinian gravitation comprises 
affine, conformal, and metrical structures. But, in contradistinction to Newtonian theory and 
special relativity where those structures are necessary presuppositions of the classes of inertial 
frames, they are fixed only locally, and their variation over any finite region is determined by the 
distribution of mass-energy. This is not to say that everything in Einsteinian gravitation is 
dynamical, but, in this way and others, Einsteinian gravitation motivates the revision of the 
space-time structures of Newtonian theory and special relativity. Space and time cease to be a 
fixed stage and become actors. 
 
A number of physicists and philosophers of physics, notably Rovelli (2001; 2004), 
Smolin (2006), and others pursuing loop quantum gravity, have seen in this empirical claim an 
insight about nature that ought to be preserved in a future theory. In their interpretation of the 
claim, they have fashioned a new concept that they call ‘background-independence’. This is the 
concept to be explicated, but, roughly speaking, to say that a physical theory is background-
independent means that physical processes do not unfold against a spatio-temporal framework 
that is presupposed a priori but determine a dynamical framework in their evolution. This new 
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concept figures in a new heuristic principle that they believe to be fruitful for those pursuing a 
quantum theory of space, time, and gravitation. Smolin states it as a maxim: ‘Seek to make 
progress by identifying the background structure in our theories and removing it, replacing it with 
relations which evolve subject to dynamical law.’ (2006, p. 204). The proper methodological 
analysis of such a heuristic principle is an outstanding philosophical project, one I hope to pursue 
in future work. 
 
In this essay, I take up a prerequisite task. I ask: What is this background-structure that 
Smolin would have us identify and remove? I propose and evaluate four candidates for 
background-independence, and I show that there is something chimaerical about the sought-after 
concept. My aim, however, is not solely critical and sceptical. I argue that there is a proposal for 
background-independence—one that stems from the work of Trautman, Anderson, and 
Friedman—that clarifies the particular feature of Einsteinian gravitation that is the basis for 
nearly all proposals for background-independence. 
 
2. Background-independence and general covariance 
There is a sense in which the earliest discussion of background-structure is found in Newton’s 
criticism of Cartesian physics in De grav. But let us begin by getting clear on the kind and degree 
of background-independence exemplified in Einsteinian gravitation. 
 
Einstein took the first steps towards the account of motion characteristic of his gravitation 
theory in ‘On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’ (1905 [1952b]). The Newtonian 
framework uncritically assumes that we have a way of determining whether spatially separated 
frames agree on which events are simultaneous. In the 1905 paper, Einstein argued that 
determining the time of occurrence of spatially separated events depends on a process of 
signalling. The invariance of the velocity of light—implicit in Maxwell’s theory and established 
empirically by Michelson, Morley, and others—provided such a signal, and Einstein argued that 
a criterion involving emitted and reflected signals permits the derivation of the Lorentz 
transformations. This is the basis of Einstein’s special theory of relativity. One outcome of 
Einstein’s analysis of simultaneity was the replacement of the nineteenth-century inertial frame 
concept with the 1905 inertial frame concept: An inertial frame is not merely one in uniform 
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rectilinear motion but also one in which light travels equal distances in equal times in arbitrary 
directions. 
 
With the special theory of relativity, it was necessary to find a new theory of gravitation 
that would overcome the contradiction between the invariance of the velocity of light and the 
instantaneous action at a distance postulated by Newtonian gravitation. In 1907, Einstein had an 
insight that has been formalised in a principle called the equivalence principle.2 Einstein 
formulated the principle in a number of ways, but perhaps most perspicuously by way of the 
thought experiment now known as ‘Einstein’s elevator’. Suppose you are inside a box from 
which you cannot see out. You feel a ‘gravitational force’ towards the floor, just as you would at 
home. But you have no way of excluding the possibility that the box is in a rocket moving with 
acceleration g in free space and that the force you feel is an accelerative force. Particles dropped 
in the box will fall with the same acceleration regardless of their mass or composition. This leads 
to the following statement of the equivalence principle: It is impossible to distinguish locally 
between a homogeneous gravitational field and uniform acceleration. But Einstein also ran the 
thought experiment the other way: Suppose you are inside the box. Only, this time, you feel no 
gravitational force, just as in free space. But you have no way of excluding the possibility that 
you are freely falling in a gravitational field. This second aspect of the thought experiment is 
particularly important: Einstein drew from it that matter obeys the same laws in a locally freely 
falling frame as it would in an inertial frame. In this way, Einstein began to recognise that freely 
falling motion and inertial motion are different presentations of the same motion. 
 
But there is a further step in Einstein’s argument: Einstein argued from the hypothesis that 
all bodies fall with the same acceleration in the same gravitational field to the stronger hypothesis 
that not only matter but light—and moreover, all physical processes—obey the same laws in a 
freely falling frame as they would in an inertial one. Without this extension, some phenomena, 
electromagnetic phenomena, e.g., would be a basis for measuring the acceleration of a freely 
falling particle relative to electromagnetically accelerated trajectories, namely trajectories not 
determined by gravitation. This would be no different from our ability to measure the 
                                                
2The following is not intended as a careful account of the equivalence principle—it is intended as a sketch of the role 
of the principle in the argument for the 1907 inertial frame concept. For a careful account of the role of the principle 
in that argument, see Norton (1985). 
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acceleration of an electron in an electromagnetic field relative to the inertial trajectory of a 
particle that is not affected by that field. This extension reflects what Will (1993, p. 68) has called 
the ‘universal coupling’ of all non-gravitational fields to the gravitational field. If any phenomena 
failed to couple to gravitation in this way, they would indicate the existence of a ‘background-
structure’ that is distinguishable from the gravitational field. As Will has put it, universal 
coupling allows us to ‘discuss the metric g as a property of space-time itself rather than as a field 
over space-time’ (Will, 1993, p. 68). 
 
With his insight of 1907 and the crucial extension to all physical processes, Einstein 
recognised that freely falling motion and inertial motion are different presentations of the same 
motion. In this respect, the equivalence principle functions as a criterion for identifying inertial 
frames and freely falling ones. The equivalence principle fatally undermines the determinateness 
of the 1905 inertial frame concept. It establishes that the concept is not uniquely determined by 
its empirical criteria. With this identification, the fundamental distinction between inertial and 
non-inertial frames was collapsed, and the relevant distinction became one between systems in 
free-fall and systems in non-free-fall motion. 
 
With the 1907 inertial frame concept, Einstein was faced with the question, how is the 
concept to be interpreted? Einstein’s chain of reasoning towards an answer is the subject of 
debate, but there is a rational reconstruction of that reasoning that highlights the essential steps. 
Special relativity presupposes the mathematical structure of an affine space equipped with a 
Minkowski metric. In the special theory, the trajectories of bodies moving inertially and also 
those of light rays are interpreted as the straight lines or geodesics with respect to the Minkowski 
metric while gravitation is a force that pulls bodies off their straight-line trajectories. But 
Einstein, with much help from Grossmann, saw that Riemann’s newly-developed theory of 
manifolds offered an alternative to such an affine space for interpreting inertial trajectories: The 
inertial trajectories of freely falling particles can be interpreted as the geodesics with respect to a 
new metric that is determined by the distribution of mass and energy in the universe. This 
reinterpretation of free fall is summarised in what has been called the geodesic principle: Free 
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massive test particles traverse time-like geodesics.3 The geodesic principle interprets the 1907 
inertial frame concept by expressing a criterion for its application. It provides a framework of 
investigation in which one can begin to think about how to construct a theory where gravitation is 
represented as a manifestation of the curvature of space-time structure that is determined by the 
distribution of mass and energy. In this framework of investigation, Einstein realised that there is 
no way of smoothly laying down a global coordinate system and that the laws of his gravitation 
theory required a coordinate-independent expression. He referred to that requirement as the 
principle of general covariance. 
 
With the geodesic principle and the requirement of general covariance with which 
Einstein connected it, no longer was there an equivalence class of preferred coordinate systems 
determined by the laws, and no longer were there non-dynamical affine, conformal, and metrical 
structures. Though Einstein did not use the term ‘background-independence’, he certainly 
appealed to the notion in his own characterisations of his gravitation theory. I will call that notion 
Proposal 1. A theory is background-independent just in case it satisfies the requirement of 
general covariance. 
 
But no sooner do we have this proposal in hand than we must respond to an objection: General 
covariance was trivialised nearly as soon as it was presented. In ‘The Foundation of the General 
Theory of Relativity’ (1916 [1952a]), Einstein gave an argument for general covariance that, 
following Stachel (1980), we now know as ‘the point-coincidence argument’. The locution 
‘point-coincidence’ refers to the view that all physical observations consist in the determination 
of purely topological relations (coincidences) between objects of spatiotemporal perception. The 
argument runs as follows: (P1) All evidence for or against a physical theory rests on immediately 
verifiable facts. (P2) Immediately verifiable facts are exhausted by point-coincidences. (C) Thus, 
physical observations are reducible to point-coincidences. On this argument, any mapping that 
preserves point-coincidences preserves a theory’s physical content, and thus no coordinate 
system is privileged. 
 
                                                
3The geodesic principle is stated in terms of test particles because it holds only approximately for extended bodies. 
The geodesic principle for light rays may be stated: Light rays traverse light-like geodesics. 
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Kretschmann (1917) brought to light an important physical implication of the point-
coincidence argument that he took to trivialise general covariance. He thought that, if indeed a 
theory’s physical content is exhausted by point-coincidences, the equations of any theory can be 
made generally covariant without a modification of that content. Kretschmann’s challenge was 
taken seriously in the 1960s by Trautman, Anderson, Wheeler, Fock, and others, who learnt to 
distinguish the requirement of general covariance from the symmetries that equations of motion 
formulated in the Einsteinian framework admit. Henceforth, we will be discussing those 
symmetries and not the requirement of general covariance as understood by Einstein. 
 
3. The Anderson-Friedman programme 
J L Anderson (1967) challenged the view that general covariance is the characteristic feature of 
Einsteinian gravitation, pointing out, as Kretschmann did, that any theory can be given a 
generally covariant formulation. He claimed that the characteristic feature of Einsteinian 
gravitation is its lack of an ‘absolute object’. Anderson’s proposal was taken up by Friedman 
(1983), who sought to give it a more perspicuous formulation, and the following definitions are 
Friedman’s. To state the proposal properly, I will give an abstract sketch of a classical field 
theory. I will do so only in meanest outline and in a familiar notation. See Pitts (2006) for a 
technically and historically careful treatment of the Anderson-Friedman programme and the 
differences between Anderson’s and Friedman’s definitions. 
 
Let me represent the space-time of a classical field theory T as an ordered n-tuple of the 
form (M, O1, ..., On), where M is a smooth manifold and O1 , ... , On are geometric objects on M. 
Defining geometric objects is a non-trivial task, but, in general, the objects in question are 
tensors, tensor fields, and also metric-compatible connections. The dynamical laws of T will be 
built up out of these geometric objects. These laws have the form f(O1, ..., On) = 0. 
 
Let me turn now to the notion of an automorphic mapping of geometric objects on the 
manifold. If (M, φ1, ..., φn) and (M, θ1, ..., θn) are both models for T, then for every point p of M 
there is a mapping d of a neighbourhood A of p onto a neighbourhood B of p such that φi = d θi on 
A ∩ B. If that mapping is infinitely differentiable, one-to-one, onto, and has an infinitely 
differentiable inverse, then the mapping, denoted d, is called a diffeomorphism. The arbitrary 
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diffeomorphisms d form a group, often denoted diff(M) as a reminder that they are 
automorphisms of M. Elements of diff(M) act on the geometric objects of the theory in question. 
 
With this framework in hand, let me return to the Anderson-Friedman proposal for 
characterising Einsteinian gravitation and other classical field theories. A geometric object Oi is 
an absolute object of T just in case for any two T-models (M, φ1, ..., φn) and (M, θ1, ..., θn) φi and 
θi are invariant under diff(M). A geometric object that does not satisfy this definition is a 
dynamical object. 
 
Anderson’s distinction between absolute and dynamical objects is the basis of his 
definition of a theory’s symmetry group, namely the largest subgroup of diff(M) that leaves 
invariant the theory’s absolute objects. It is noteworthy that, though Anderson defines a theory’s 
symmetry group in terms of that theory’s antecedently defined absolute objects, on an alternative 
understanding, the lack of absolute objects would be expressed by the lack of non-trivial 
symmetries. 
 
This definition is significant because it meets Kretschmann’s challenge: Theories may be 
reformulated so that their geometric objects are invariant under the actions of subgroups of 
diff(M) like the Poincaré group or so that they are invariant under diff(M) itself, even though, in 
their standard formulations, they would be invariant only under more limited mapping groups. It 
is precisely the further requirement expressed in the above definition that is supposed to 
distinguish a theory’s symmetry group from its mapping or covariance group. That requirement 
distinguishes Einsteinian gravitation, which Anderson claimed lacks an absolute object, from 
previous theories. 
 
4. Background-structure represented by geometric objects and beyond 
I have presented the definition of an absolute object not only to move beyond the trivialisation of 
general covariance but because Anderson took the presence of absolute objects in a theory’s 
equations to imply that theory’s commitment to a certain form of ‘background-structure’, though 
he himself did not use that term. Thus, the Anderson-Friedman definition provides us with 
another strategy for identifying background-independence, which I will call 
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Proposal 2. A theory is background-independent just in case it has no absolute objects. 
 
With this proposal, the notion of background is entirely determined by the geometric objects on a 
manifold.4 
 
As with proposal 1, no sooner do we have this proposal in hand than we must respond to a 
line of objection, namely that the Anderson-Friedman distinction between absolute and 
dynamical objects cannot capture the intended and essentially physical distinction. Geroch 
(reported in Friedman, 1983, p. 59, n. 9) pointed out that there are models for Einsteinian 
gravitation in which geometric objects like nowhere-vanishing vector fields and symplectic forms 
count as absolute objects. He made his point with the following example. Suppose we have a 
cosmological model in which there is omnipresent dust, all particles of which are at rest in some 
Lorentz frame. Pressure-free dust has the stress-energy tensor Tab = ρUaUb, where the density of 
the dust particles ρ is defined as the number of particles per unit volume in the unique inertial 
frame in which the particles are at rest and Ua is the four-velocity. In such a universe, the four-
velocity would be nowhere-vanishing and would count as an absolute object on Friedman’s 
definition. That is, there would be a background reference frame in the imaginary model, the rest 
frame of the dust. Torretti (1984, p. 285) offered another counterexample to the Anderson-
Friedman distinction. He formulated a theory of modified Newtonian mechanics in which each 
model has a space of constant non-positive curvature, but different models have different values 
of curvature. He pointed out that such curvature is undeniably a kind of background-structure, yet 
escapes the Anderson-Friedman definition of absoluteness. Pitts (2006) presents and challenges 
these and other counterexamples and he offers a defence of the Anderson-Friedman programme. 
But he concedes that Einsteinian gravitation may have an absolute object, namely the scalar 
density obtained by reducing the metric into a conformal metric density and a scalar density.5 
                                                
4There is a discussion that I would like to acknowledge, if only briefly. Though Anderson did not introduce absolute 
and dynamical objects with reference to action principles, he certainly regarded dynamical objects as variational, 
while absolute objects are not (1967, pp. 88-89). Some (e.g., Hiskes, 1984) have seen in this another way of drawing 
the absolute-dynamical distinction: No object that is varied in a theory’s action principle should be considered 
absolute. But others (e.g., Rosen, 1966; Sorkin, 2002) have argued that a flat metric can be derived from an action 
principle by introducing geometric objects that vary in the required way. It is significant that Anderson himself 
(1967, p. 83) headed off this line of objection by proscribing what he called ‘irrelevant variables’. Anderson was 
concerned with the essentially physical distinction between space-time structure in Newtonian theory and special 
relativity, on the one hand, and Einsteinian gravitation, on the other. For him, that distinction was never a merely 
formal one and he was at pains to defend it from those who would undermine it with formal ‘tricks’. 
5See Pitts (2006, pp. 366-367) for details. 
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Some may consider these counterexamples to be reason enough for giving up proposal 2. 
But Trautman (1966; 1973) hints at another way of thinking about physical theories, one that 
Pitts does not consider in his defence.6 This work suggests that the space-times of Newtonian 
theory and special relativity are characterised by absolute objects; the space-time of Einsteinian 
gravitation is characterised by dynamical ones.7 That is to say, theories of special systems 
formulated in the Newtonian or special-relativistic frameworks presuppose geometric objects that 
determine a fixed metric affine geometry; those of systems formulated in the framework of 
Einsteinian gravitation depend on geometric objects that determine a dynamical one. On this 
interpretation, there is no suggestion that Einsteinian gravitation lacks an absolute object. The 
distinction between Anderson’s and Friedman’s accounts, on the one hand, and Trautman’s, on 
the other, is not merely verbal. The claim that the metric affine geometry of Einsteinian 
gravitation is characterised by dynamical objects is importantly different from the claim that 
Einsteinian gravitation has no absolute objects. In this way, the line of objection motivated by the 
counterexamples and a debate over the viability of the Anderson-Friedman programme is better 
avoided. This way of characterising physical theories can also be used to motivate another 
proposal for background-independence; we might call it 
Proposal 2a. A theory is background-independent just in case its metric affine geometry 
is characterised by dynamical objects. 
 
This proposal helps preserve something of the intended and essentially physical distinction that 
motivated the distinction between absolute and dynamical objects. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a line of objection that undermines both proposals 2 and 2a in a 
different way. These proposals commit us to the view that whether a theory is background-
independent depends on its geometric objects. But Belot (2011, pp. 12-20) has recently pointed 
out that the concept of background-independence admits of degrees. He considers, among other 
examples, the vacuum solutions to Einstein’s field equations that give rise to de Sitter, anti-de 
                                                
6In fact, the notions of absolute and dynamical objects are due to Trautman. But it was Anderson and Friedman who 
gave them a perspicuous formulation. For this reason, Anderson and Friedman are more readily associated with them 
than Trautman. 
7Passages supportive of this reading can be found in Trautman (1973), though the claim that Einsteinian gravitation 
has no absolute object can also be found in Trautman (1966). In any case, I will attribute this reading to Trautman. 
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Sitter, and Minkowski space-times. These and other solutions have the asymptotic behaviour of 
one of the spaces of constant curvature. 
 
To take another family of examples in Einsteinian gravitation, suppose one attaches a 
boundary to a four-dimensional manifold.8 Suppose, further, that one builds into the 
kinematically possible configurations of a theory’s geometric objects not only such requirements 
as smoothness and global hyperbolicity but also the requirement that space-time is approximately 
Minkowskian as one approaches the boundary.9 Such a theory will have no geometric objects that 
determine a background, but such a theory will admit diff(M) only locally, not generally; at the 
boundary, the theory will admit only a subgroup of diff(M). The theory will lie between 
paradigmatically background-dependent theories in which geometric objects propagate in 
Minkowski space-time and paradigmatically background-independent theories such as spatially 
compact Einsteinian gravitation. So, even though the theory has no geometric objects that 
determine a background-structure, the boundary conditions ensure that any solution has the 
structure of a Minkowskian background at spatial infinity. 
 
With these sorts of situations in mind, Belot proposes an elegant scheme for fixing the 
extension of background-structure.10 No longer is background-independence an all or nothing 
affair: Theories are shown to have degrees of background-independence. To make precise various 
degrees of background-(in)dependence, Belot introduces a distinction between a theory’s 
geometrical and physical degrees of freedom. The geometrical degrees of freedom are 
represented by the geometric objects, figuring in the dynamical laws of a theory, that parametrise 
the equivalence classes of space-time geometries. The physical degrees of freedom are 
represented by the geometric objects that parametrise the quotient-space obtained by identifying 
gauge-equivalent solutions. A theory is then said to be fully background-dependent just in case it 
has no geometrical degrees of freedom, and fully background-independent just in case its 
geometrical and physical degrees of freedom match. Of greater moment, however, is the 
possibility of characterising theories of ambiguous background-structure. A theory is said to be 
nearly background-dependent if it has only finitely many geometrical degrees of freedom and 
                                                
8For details on attaching various kinds of boundaries, see, e.g., Hawking and Ellis (1973). 
9I owe this family of examples to Belot (2011). 
10The following is only a sketch of Belot’s proposal; see Belot (2011) for details. 
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nearly background-independent if it has a finite number of non-geometrical degrees of freedom. 
In this way, proposals 2 and 2a are recovered and situated in a larger space of possibilities in 
which their uniqueness is undermined.11 
 
Belot’s proposal is a significant contribution. But, as much as it clarifies the idea that 
there are various degrees of background-independence, it also sharpens the ambiguity of the 
concept. Provided that a theory has no absolute objects, does background-independence require 
(i) that a theory presuppose nothing about global structure or (ii) that a theory preclude the 
possibility of such structure? For Einsteinian gravitation could be said to satisfy neither (i) nor 
(ii) since the theory holds that geometry is everywhere locally Lorentzian, making Belot’s 
proposal trivially true, or Einsteinian gravitation could be said to satisfy only (i) in that geometry 
is dependent on the distribution of mass and energy. Though I leave aside the question of the 
methodological status of a principle like Smolin’s for future work, this particular ambiguity 
already suggests a reason to avoid asserting a meta-principle about eliminating background-
structure. 
 
Belot’s proposal also provides an opportunity to comment on the distinction between 
local and global structure in Einsteinian gravitation. Einsteinian gravitation departs from 
Newtonian theory and special relativity in that it places weaker a priori restrictions on global 
structure. (To put the point in Carnapian terms, global structure is relegated to the P-rules of the 
framework.) But that departure, though radical, does not stem from a philosophical or 
methodological motivation to construct a theory with that characteristic but from the fact that the 
equivalence principle motivates a purely local definition of a geodesic. 
 
5. Further beyond geometric objects 
To this point, I have only considered some of the strongest mathematical structures that may be 
imposed on a manifold, namely metrics and other geometric objects both absolute and dynamical. 
I have considered certain solutions to the field equations and also the imposition of asymptotic 
boundary conditions from which background-structure may arise. In contrast, Trautman (1973), 
                                                
11Belot’s proposal represents a significant advance over the work of Trautman, Anderson, and Friedman, but it is 
noteworthy that the idea that geometric objects parametrise a theory’s degrees of freedom is already there in 
Trautman (1966, p. 322). 
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Thorne, Lee, and Lightman (1973), Smolin (2006), and others have pointed out that one may 
count dimension, topological and differential structure, temporal orientation, and even the metric 
signature as background-structures, though they leave it as an open question whether these lower 
levels of background-structure are essential to all physical theories or whether they may be 
replaced by a future theory. In this vein, one might ask, why use the real numbers as opposed to 
some other field? And, taking this still further, one might well ask whether all the mathematical 
structures a theory ‘quantifies over’ are to be considered background-structures. Though I take 
the suggestion of Trautman and others seriously, it reinforces that there is something chimaerical 
about background-independence: No sooner have we cut off one head than two more spring up to 
take its place; no sooner do we seem to be getting a hold of the concept when it slips away again. 
In any case, it is noteworthy that Einsteinian gravitation presupposes these lower-level features, 
yet allows for scenarios in which certain of these features are violated by (e.g.) singularities. 
 
How, then, are we to fix the extension of background-independence so as to include those 
kinds of background-structures that escape a proposal such as Belot’s? There is an intuition that 
seems to underlie the views of Smolin (2006), Giulini (2007), Belot (2011), and others. And, 
though I do not do full justice to their views, I will summarise it in what I call 
Proposal 3. A theory is background-independent just in case it has no fixed ‘stage’ that 
shapes the evolution of the fields without itself being shaped by them. 
 
This proposal is very nearly the so-called action-reaction principle: For something to be physical 
it cannot act without being acted upon.12 For Einstein, something like this principle is satisfied by 
his gravitation theory and not by Newtonian theory or special relativity. And the idea certainly 
lies behind Anderson’s definition of an absolute object. I will not address here Einstein’s view 
that space-time should not act without being acted upon. Nor will I address the bearing of the 
action-reaction principle on discussions of background-independence. But it is important to note 
that the action-reaction principle seems to loom behind nearly all proposals for fixing the 
extension of background-independence. 
 
                                                
12So far as I know, ‘action-reaction principle’ nowhere appears in Einstein’s writings, though the idea is certainly 
there. See, e.g., Brown (1996; 2005), where the principle is formulated explicitly. 
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A metaphor by Novalis—‘Theories are nets: only he who casts will catch’—is 
particularly apt for the evaluation of proposal 3. The main objection to proposal 3 is that it is a 
step too far: It is a catch-all for virtually any kind of mathematics used in the formulation of a 
theory. All of the above proposals are subsumed, but room is left for other conceptions of 
background-structure. It may be that some still finer-grained classification is possible, but I will 
not attempt that here. I only want to point out that, by catching everything, proposal 3 blurs even 
the line between the language required for saying anything at all and interpreted mathematical 
theories. Where that line is drawn varies from theory to theory, and it is not drawn a priori or by 
some philosophical or methodological demand such as (e.g.) the demand that a theory be 
background-independent. Rather, it is a set of empirical criteria—the laws of motion, a criterion 
for identifying time of occurrence, the geodesic principle—that controls the application of some 
or another body of mathematical theory. In Einsteinian gravitation, for instance, one needs an 
empirical reason to consider certain solutions to the field equations as physical possibilities or to 
impose asymptotic boundary conditions, and, in view of that, one might not want to formulate the 
theory or a meta-theoretical principle about the theory so that certain solutions or the imposition 
of boundary conditions is precluded a priori. At the very least, an important strength of proposals 
2 and 2a over proposal 3—or any proposal motivated by the action-reaction principle or 
something like it—is that it does not dissolve the important differentiation of background-
structures into a ‘night in which all cows are black’. 
 
If proposal 3 is a step too far, what, if anything, remains to be said about proposals 2 and 
2a? I have presented the case against these proposals: I have charged them with failing to account 
for kinds of background-structures that are not determined by the geometric objects on a 
manifold. To be sure, the analysis of the concept of background-structure cannot end with 
proposals 2 and 2a. But the net cast by Trautman, Anderson, and Friedman was a good one. It is a 
virtue of proposal 2a that it illuminates a central feature of Einsteinian gravitation: The 
Einsteinian framework does not presuppose certain global structures, though it does not preclude 
them. It does not preclude, for example, that we might want to study bounded systems like stars, 
and so investigate space-times that are asymptotically flat. That one can formulate and study 
scenarios such as those identified by Geroch and Belot does not diminish that proposal’s isolation 
of the difference between theories formulated in a Newtonian or special-relativistic framework, 
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on the one hand, and certain theories formulated in the framework of Einsteinian gravitation, on 
the other. In this way, that proposal sharpens—and does not blur—the feature of Einsteinian 
gravitation that is the basis for nearly all proposals for background-independence. 
 
With a clearer understanding of the empirical motivation for a dynamical geometry, we 
might attempt to express Smolin’s methodological principle more reasonably. We might 
formulate it: ‘Find out whether there are background-structures that cannot be empirically 
motivated and eliminate them.’ But this principle, too, reflects no philosophical insight peculiar 
to Einsteinian gravitation. In the absence of some particular empirical motivation for applying or 
eliminating a given mathematical structure, it reflects only the standard empiricist’s application 
of Ockham’s razor—and it could apply not only to background-structures, understood in terms of 
absolute objects, but also to dynamical objects if they have no empirical motivation. By 
criticising Smolin’s principle, I do not mean to suggest that no meta-principles play or have 
played a heuristic role in theory construction. But what is revealed in Einstein’s own construction 
of his theories, and in his provision of empirical criteria that articulate theoretical concepts, is that 
methodological analysis promises a clearer understanding than meta-principles of what 
constraints are imposed by our present understanding of gravitation on future theories. 
 
6. Conclusions and a further consideration 
With each of my proposals, I have tried to identify a genuine candidate for background-
independence. There is a sense in which the requirement of general covariance is a candidate for 
background-independence. But Kretschmann showed that theories that are not generally 
covariant in their standard formulations may be reformulated, a point that the Anderson-
Friedman programme masterfully addressed. I argued next that there is an important sense in 
which a theory that has no absolute objects—or whose metric affine geometry is characterised by 
a dynamical object—is a candidate for background-independence. But the challenges to 
proposals 2 and 2a, from several directions, seemed to suggest that this strategy could not capture 
important conceptions of background-structure. This motivated proposal 3. That proposal 
captures too much, and I suggested that one might want to distinguish between different kinds of 
background-structures, namely those arising from certain solutions to Einstein’s field equations, 
from the imposition of boundary conditions, and from lower levels of background-structure. In 
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this regard, Belot’s proposal is significant for its clarification of the sense in which even a theory 
whose metric affine geometry is characterised by a dynamical object can still have various 
degrees of background-independence. But Belot’s proposal also draws attention to the more basic 
question of what is demanded by the concept of background-independence. I have suggested that, 
though Belot’s analysis provides an important explication, it says nothing about whether the 
concept requires that a theory presuppose nothing about global structure or that a theory preclude 
the possibility of such structure. The empirical interest of studying certain isolated systems in 
Einsteinian gravitation, e.g., would appear to be a good reason not to preclude the possibility of 
such structure a priori. We are left, then, with only the weaker demand that a theory presuppose 
nothing about global structure—at least so far as we set aside questions about lower-level 
background-structures like topological and differential structures, the metric signature, and 
others. This is the sense that the programme of Trautman, Anderson, and Friedman succeeds in 
capturing. So, while there is something chimaerical about background-independence, there is also 
a sense in which the feature of Einsteinian gravitation that motivated all of the proposals is aptly 
captured by that programme. 
 
There is a further consideration with which I would like to conclude. I set out by recalling 
the fundamental insight into the nature of the gravitational interaction that is summarised in the 
equivalence principle. I recalled that the equivalence principle motivated a new inertial frame 
concept and that the geodesic principle expresses a criterion for the application of that concept. 
 
The equivalence principle that I have discussed has been called ‘Einstein’s equivalence 
principle’, which is itself an interpretive extrapolation from the universality of free fall. 
Einsteinian gravitation is not the only theory that satisfies this equivalence principle: Newtonian 
theory satisfies it too. Anderson (1967), Ehlers (1973), and others have shown that Einsteinian 
gravitation also satisfies another principle. This has been called ‘the principle of minimal 
coupling’, according to which no terms of the special-relativistic equations of motion contain the 
Riemann curvature tensor. In this way, minimal coupling ensures that special relativity is a local 
approximation so long as tidal gravitational effects can be ignored. Not only does Einsteinian 
gravitation satisfy this stronger demand—it is essential for ensuring the local validity of special 
relativity. The conjunction of Einstein’s equivalence principle and minimal coupling amounts to 
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what has been called ‘the strong equivalence principle’.13 The strong principle implies that no 
more than the dynamical metric gab is needed to account for gravitation. 
 
This stronger principle bears directly on the question of background-independence 
because a modification of Einsteinian gravitation like the Brans-Dicke theory, which comprises 
absolute and dynamical objects, fails to satisfy it. The exclusion of the Brans-Dicke theory and 
others by the strong equivalence principle serves to isolate, in yet another way, what is distinctive 
about Einsteinian gravitation. Here the strong equivalence principle is playing the same role as 
proposal 2 in excluding those theories that comprise absolute objects. In this way, the strong 
equivalence principle further clarifies the sense in which Einsteinian gravitation is background-
independent, whether or not the concept is of any service as a heuristic. 
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